Hume—Part 4

The Roots of Collectivism

There is something else Gramsci and Hume had in common—they are both thoroughgoing collectivists. Gramsci’s Marxism is obviously collectivist but it may not be as obvious that Hume was an unabashed collectivist, as well.

[Note: By collectivism I mean that principle, which in any form, stands against its opposite, Individualism. Collectivism, in most people’s minds, is usually associated with a government or political system, but collectivism is a fundamental concept, of which collectivists states are only one manifestation. Collectivism is anything that subordinates the individual to some collective, that is, any group, organization, movement, or cause; most frequently, one’s community, society, country, or all mankind. It is not being a member of a group that makes one a collectivist; but, to the extent one subordinates their own desires, plans, purposes, resources, or any other aspect of their life to those of a group on the grounds the group’s ends are more important than one’s own, and to the extent an individual derives their sense of self-worth, purpose, or meanig from their association with a group rather than from their own merit, values, and understanding, they are collectivists.] In An Enquiry into the Principles of Morals “Section II, Of Benevolence, Part II,” Hume wrote:

“We may observe that, in displaying the praises of any humane, beneficent man, there is one circumstance which never fails to be amply insisted on, namely, the happiness and satisfaction, derived to society from his intercourse and good offices.” [Emphasis mine.]

For Hume, an individual’s value is determined solely by his benefit to society. For Hume, even justice is not for the sake of individuals.

In “Section III, Of Justice, Part I, he writes, “… public utility is the sole origin of justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the sole foundation of its merit …”

It’s even worse when we know what Hume means by “justice” is what we call, “property rights.”

“Hence the ideas of property become necessary in all civil society: Hence justice derives its usefulness to the public: And hence alone arises its merit and moral obligation.”

Laws are not meant to protect individuals. In “Part II” he writes, “If we examine the particular laws, by which justice is directed, and property determined; we shall still be presented with the same conclusion. The good of mankind is the only object of all these laws and regulations. … contrived to serve farther the interests of society.”

The proper name of this view is socialism.

Subjectivist Morality

In “Section IX Of the Reason of Animals,” Hume reveals that he finds no distinction between human and animal consciousness, which in one stroke wipes out Aristotelian identification of man as the rational animal. “… reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves; and in its chief operations, is not directed by any such relations or comparisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties. Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation, and the whole economy and order of its nursery.”

He has already wiped out the concept of volition, and now relegates reason to the position of an instinct. Hume, therefore, does not regard human beings as rational/volitional beings (the only kind of beings that require or are capable of having values) and it is not surprising he denies any possibility of objective values and relegates all of morality to subjective feelings.

Having already divorced reason from action in, “Book II, Part III, Sect 3,” he proceeds to divorce ethical values (“morals”) from reason as well: “Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be derived from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already proved, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.”

At this point, Hume presents what philosophers regard as his famous “is/ought” problem:

“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.”

Hume’s argument is essentially that there is no logical way to get from a description of what is to what ought to be or what one ought to do. The argument is incorrect, and I will briefly discuss the nature of the mistake at the end of this section, but here only want to point out that Hume has now completely divorced moral or ethical values from human choice, human reason, and reality or existence itself. Hume resorts, again, to the only thing that is left—subjective feelings:

Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; but if examined, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discovered by the understanding. This is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason. But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allowed to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but it is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind … Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour.” [Emphasis mine.]

If it occurs to you to ask, how does one with Hume’s views know what “virtue” and “vice” are, your question would be well founded, because he has argued such things have nothing to do with facts, or reason, or choices. There is an answer, however. Remember, Hume is a thoroughgoing collectivist. All his “values” are social one’s. Virtue, for Hume, is whatever is good for society, Vice is what ever is bad for society. Who decides what is good or bad for society? Collectivists never get around to asking that question, but I’ll give the answer anyway—it’s whoever is in power.

_values_—Values, ethical or otherwise, are not proscription or prescription, but principles. Values do not tell us what to do, they provide the means of making judgements, such as comparing the merits of certain actions, determining their consequences, and relating short term gains or losses with long term ones, for example. Values are the means of making correct choices and taking the correct action in relation to some goal or purpose or end depending on the situation or context—situations and contexts change, but values are absolute.

Values are always of the nature, “if you want to achieve this, than this is what you must do.” The goal, purpose, or end determines the kind of values—if the goal is good health, for example, values would include principles of hygiene, diet, and proper medical practices. Values are based on all the facts of reality pertaining to the particular goal or objective; they are that which “is” that determines what you “must” do to achieve the goal or objective. (Values do not provide “oughts.” They are not suggestions, they are absolutes that one must conform to if one is to successfully achieve their goals and ends–all else is a defiance of reality and a sure course to failure.) Values do not provide the goals, purposes, or ends.

_ethics_—Ethics are those values that pertain to a very specific end or purpose—to live happily and successfully as a human being. The facts ethical values are based on are the nature of a human being and the nature of the world he lives in. It is the nature of man that determines the requirements of his happiness and success, it is the nature of the world that determines what is possible to him, and what the consequences of his actions will be.

Ethics are only for those who choose to live as happily and successfully as possible in this world. No one is required by ethics to live ethically—to the extent one does not live ethically, however, they will surely be unhappy failures.]

You Are Not

For Hume, outside the context of society you have no value or meaning. In fact, you don’t really exist. “You,” is just the name of a delusion.

In, “Book I, Part IV, Section VI, Of Personal Identity” of his A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume writes:

“It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea.”

Remembering that by “impressions” and “ideas” Hume only means our more and less vivid perceptions, Hume is essentially saying, we cannot be a conscious self because consciousness consists of nothing more than separate perceptions. But notice the stolen concepts ( Italicised), “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.”

One is tempted to ask what Hume means by, “my part,” if there is no self, what does the “part” belong to; or what is it he is insensible of when he is, “insensible of myself,” if there is no “myself” and what exactly does “I” refer to; but I know they would be dismissed as rhetorical expressions. But Hume admits something here, inadvertently. He plainly distinguishes between conscious and unconscious states, to which I’ll return.

For Hume, there are only a series of separate percepts which have no connection to each other and that is all there is and it is that which is mistaken for the conscious self: “… I may venture to affirm of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.

“The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. … The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is composed.

Hume was not a physicalist. I’ve already mentioned his belief in the soul, but his argument is essentially a physicalist argument that very much resembles the argument of the behaviorists, who also rejected the idea of consciousness because it could not be demonstrated; that is, it could not in any way be perceived. But both Hume and the behaviorists assumed that if there is a consciousness (conscious self or mind) it could be perceived. Hume’s very argument is he could never perceive such a thing. The behaviorists reason, at least, was based on their conviction that there is only the physical, and if consciousness was either a physical thing or physical attribute, it could be perceived by some means. Hume does not have that excuse. The non-physical cannot be perceived and if the consciousness is not physical or a physical attribute (which it is not) it cannot be perceived.

Hume supposedly bases his argument on his own experience, which he assumes is the same as all others, but he is a very poor observer. If he is nothing more than a series of percepts, how does that series of percepts, “enter most intimately into what I call myself?” since “myself” is only the same series of percepts. Translation: introspection is a series of percepts observing itself. Oddly enough, this is very close to the truth. In one sense, consciousness truly is only our percepts, it is how we are conscious. Hume’s mistake is very simple, while he knew he had percepts (was conscious) because he could not perceive the perceiving (without which the percepts would have been impossible) he denied he was doing it. But he knew he was doing it, else he could not have made the distinction between his conscious (awake) and unconscious (asleep) states.

I am being generous in calling this gross sophistry a mistake. Hume’s “moral” philosophy is filled with expressions relating moral virtue with pleasure and vice with pain. He says, for example, “We are conscious, that we ourselves, in adapting means to ends, are guided by reason and design, and that it is not ignorantly nor casually we perform those actions, which tend to self-preservation, to the obtaining pleasure, and avoiding pain.” But if my conscious self is nothing more than a series of perceptions, and current perceptions do not effect or have connection to future perceptions, that is, there is no “self” that experiences both present and future percepts, why would a present pain produce the least bit of concern about any future one’s, and why would I act to avoid them, if there is no self that is going to experience them both? We only could be concerned with avoiding future pain if we know it is the same conscious self that will be experiencing them.

Hume’s illustration of consciousness or “the mind” as a “kind of theatre,” is not a bad one, though he is quick to dismiss it as deceptive, because we cannot know, “where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it [the theatre] is composed,” which assumes it is “physical” in some way; but it does not matter where or what the theater is, it is what Hume leaves out of his illustration that is wrong with it—there is no audience. If perception were nothing but events in an empty theatre, there would be no percepts.

1776 to 2007

Hume died in the same year the US Declaration of Independence was signed. Everything the men who wrote that document knew and were willing to risk their lives to win was repudiated by Hume and all those philosophers who were influenced by and followed him. The single most important concept that dominated the views of the founders of The United States of America was the concept of individualism—individual freedom, individual rights, and individual responsibility. Though couched in the language of the religions they held, the guiding principle was that every individual owned their own life, that their success or failure were determined by how well they lived their lives, that they must be free to live their lives as they chose, and that no one was born with any responsibility in life but for their own life (and to their God, if they believed in one), which is to say, the requirements of reality as one understood it.

Almost all of the principles held by the founders of America have today been lost to the vast majority of Americans, they have been lost by propagation of Humean ideas through the multitude of streams described in my previous article. In my next article we will begin to examine each of those individual streams, emphasizing their destructive influence on today’s society and culture throughout the West, but particularly in America.