Rand’s Mistake—What is the Mind?

by Reginald Firehammer

In my post on “Memory” I included this quote:

AR: “Oh yes, certainly. I have stated that words are perceptual symbols which stand for these products of the mental integrations.

“And in case this isn’t clear, I would like to add one thing. Why did I say ‘perceptual’? Because words are available to us either visually or auditorially. They are given to us in sensory, perceptual form. And by means of grasping them, on the perceptual level, we are able to operate with concepts as single mental units. In other words, every time we think of the concept ‘table,’ we don’t have to add up the sum of all the tables we have seen or visualize them. ‘Table’ as a sound or a visual image is on the perceptual level. Mentally, it stands for that particular integration of concretes which we have called ‘table.’

“So the word is not the concept, but the word is the auditory or visual symbol which stands for a concept. And a concept is a mental entity; it cannot be perceived perceptually. That’s the role played by words.” [Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, “Appendix—The Role of Words.”]

Rand says that a concept cannot be perceived perceptually, because it is a “mental entity.” If this is taken literally, it means the mind is something different from perception. In fact, it means the mind is not even conscious—there is obviously something wrong here. It contradicts Rand’s own mistaken view of consciousness.

From the beginning Rand equates consciousness with perception:

“Consciousness, to repeat, is the faculty of perceiving that which exists. (‘Perceiving’ is used here in its widest sense, equivalent to ‘being aware of.’) To be conscious is to be conscious of something.”

Here is Ayn Rand’s crucial passage in regard to the above:

“Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists.”

[Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism:The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, “Chapter 1—Reality”]

If consciousness is the faculty of perceiving that which exists, and concepts cannot be perceived, it cannot be by means of consciousness that we know them. Since Rand refers to them as, “mental entities,” she is saying that concepts, and the mind as well, are not aspects of consciousness. But then, what are they?

In other places, both she and Peikoff refer to something they call “conceptual consciousness,” but they do not explain what conceptual consciousness is or how it’s different from “perceptual consciousness.”

There is only this passage in Rand, which does not explain what “conceptual consciousness,” is, but does indicate she believes there is such a thing and that it is different from just “perceptual consciousness.”

“Consciousness, as a state of awareness, is not a passive state, but an active process that consists of two essentials: differentiation and integration.

“Although, chronologically, man’s consciousness develops in three stages: the stage of sensations, the perceptual, the conceptual—epistemologically, the base of all of man’s knowledge is the perceptual stage.

“… It is in the form of percepts that man grasps the evidence of his senses and apprehends reality. When we speak of “direct perception” or “direct awareness,” we mean the perceptual level. …”

[Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, “1. Cognition and Measurement”]

There is a grave mistake in this passage and it leads to philosophical confusion. But it is not only in Rand’s philosophy, but in the entire history of philosophy this confusion reins. The mistake is in the very first sentence. “Consciousness, as a state of awareness, is not a passive state, but an active process …”

Consciousness is a process only in the sense that it is an attribute of life, which, at the physical level is observed as a process of a living organism. In order to be conscious something has to be going on—in order for the television to display a picture something has to be going on; but the television doesn’t do anything but display a picture and consciousness doesn’t do anything but enable us to perceive what we perceive.

Consciousness does not do or cause any action whatsoever. Other events take place as epiphenomenon of or in response to the content of consciousness, including memory, emotions, and even overt behavior, but consciousness does not do them. The mistake is in confusing the fact that we are conscious of all these things, with the assumption that consciousness is doing them. It is exactly the same mistake we would make if we thought the events in a television program were being “done” or “caused” by the television image itself.

Our consciousness is only an “observer” but it observes everything including everything we do. In animals, the overt behavior is the instinctive response to the content of consciousness and is automatic, but the consciousness of the animal does not do the responding, instinct does and the consciousness only observes it. In man there is no automatic response to the content of consciousness, except for the emotions and, to some extent, memory recall, because man must choose that behavior, and is conscious of that choosing. The consciousness does not do the choosing, volition does, but we are conscious of the choosing, and cannot choose without being conscious of it. This fact is mistakenly called, “volitional consciousness,” and that mistake has been the source of endless philosophical confusion about the nature of the mind, which Rand was also infected by.

It shows up in such expressions as, “rational—i.e., conceptual—consciousness,”

“As a being of rational—i.e., conceptual—consciousness, man is unable to live like an animal, on the range of the immediate moment.”

[The Ayn Rand Letter, Vol. II, No. 2 October 23, 1972, “A Nation’s Unity—Part II”]

… or as, “volitional, conceptual consciousness,”

“This gives us a lead to another special aspect of axiomatic concepts: although they designate a fundamental metaphysical fact, axiomatic concepts are the products of an epistemological need—the need of a volitional, conceptual consciousness which is capable of error and doubt.”

[Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, “6. Axiomatic Concepts”]

It’s clear that Rand thinks of “conceptual consciousness” as distinct from “perceptual consciousness” and Peikoff equates it with the mind, as does Rand, I believe.

“Since a conceptual consciousness is an integrating mechanism, it requires the ultimate integration of its contents that is provided by philosophy.

“Since the mind is an integrating faculty, its contents have to be integrated; a conceptual consciousness—even a concrete-bound one—cannot escape making in some form broad generalizations about life.” [emphasis mine.]

[Objectivism:The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, “Chapter 12—Art”]

While all this does not help us understand what a concept, as a mental entity, is, if we cannot perceive it, or what the mind is, we can at least say what Rand means by an “mental entity.”

“A concept is a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated according to a specific characteristic(s) and united by a specific definition.”

[Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, “2. Concept- Formation”]

Since she defines a concept, which she calls a “mental entity” as a “mental integration” and furthermore equates the “mind” to “conceptual consciousness” and describes them both as “integrating faculties,” she obviously regards a concept something created in the mysterious “conceptual consciousness.” It is when she comes to describing how we are conscious of the “mental entity” after we create it she seems to realize that we cannot be, even in the so-called “conceptual consciousness”, conscious of a “mental entity”

It’s as though she suddenly remembers, “consciousness [is] the faculty of perceiving that which exists.” The obvious dilemma is, since concepts cannot be “perceived,” yet exist, what are they? Her answer, “mental entities” which is no answer, because we still cannot perceive them.

The correct answer is hidden in Rand’s discussion of definitions.

“To know the exact meaning of the concepts one is using, … one must be able to retrace the specific (logical, not chronological) steps by which they were formed, and one must be able to demonstrate their connection to their base in perceptual reality.”

[Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, “5. Definitions”]

However abstract, every concept must ultimately be based on that reality we are conscious of, which we can directly perceive, because that is the only reality we can know, and whatever we cannot be conscious of and cannot be based on what we are conscious of we cannot know at all.

Rand said, “words are perceptual symbols which stand for these products of the mental integrations,” she calls concepts. She goes on, “Why did I say “perceptual”? Because words are available to us either visually or auditorially. They are given to us in sensory, perceptual form. … “Table” as a sound or a visual image is on the perceptual level. Mentally, it stands for that particular integration … which we have called “table.” … the word is not the concept, but the word is the auditory or visual symbol which stands for a concept.”

Rand equates “mind” with “conceptual consciousness,” and when she says something is “mental” she means, “associated with conceptual consciousness.” There is nothing in science, philosophy, or Objectivism that ever describes what conceptual consciousness is, because it is not consciousness (which is perception). It is the reason to be “conscious” of a concept, it must be by means of a word. If we recast Rand’s description of a word’s function, leaving out the fictitious “mental” it reads thus:

Words are perceptual symbols which stand for concepts, “words are available to us either visually or auditorially. They are given to us in sensory, perceptual form. … ‘Table’ as a sound or a visual image is on the perceptual level. It stands for that particular concept… which we have called ‘table.’ The word is not the concept, but the word is the auditory or visual symbol which stands for a concept.”

When we use a word as a symbol to identify an existent (for Rand it would only be when it identifies classes or kinds of things, i.e. universals, because she did not recognize particular concepts), that word used in that way is a concept. There is no “other mystic conceptually conscious thing” that exists in some ephemeral way in “the mind,” as a “mental entity.”

Rand’s insight into the nature of concepts, especially that the meaning of a (universal) concept are its particulars (units), not its definition, that all concepts must ultimately be based on perceived reality, that they must be non- contradictory, that all knowledge must be in terms of concepts, and that they make it possible to hold in consciousness vast amounts of information that is not possible without them are all correct and a great advance in epistemology. She was taken in by previous mistaken views of “mind” and that mistake led to the error I have identified. All I have done is apply Occam’s razor to Rand’s otherwise profound insights into the nature of conceptualization.

So what is mind? Without a full description of the process of concept formation, that is, how we associate words with the existents they identify, a complete answer is not possible. However, that process is a volitional one, because all that a human being does must be chosen. Volition is not consciousness, it is functionally above consciousness, and determines those aspects of human nature which are not automatic, to a certain extent both storage to and recall from memory and all overt behavior. We are, however, fully conscious of all volitionally determined behavior. The mind, then, includes consciousness, and all aspects of human experience and behavior we are conscious of that is in response to conscious whether automatic (e.g. the emotions) or volitional (e.g. the forming of concepts, thinking, and overt behavior), for example.