Questions and Answers to Regi's article on Perception

Hi, Regi,

In your article you wrote:

“If it were possible to photograph our perceptual field of vision while looking at our red rubber ball, we would discover the two photographs (that of the retina and that of our perceptual field of vision) were identical. Both would have a red rubber ball in them presented in the same way.”

And later:

“If there is a change to the state of some aspect of the neurological system, our perception will be affected by it.”

If the second quote is correct (and I agree it is), then the first quote must be incorrect. If the photo of what is projected onto the retina must be identical to the photo of the field of perception, then that would mean there can be no affect on perception from the state of the neurological system between the retina and where the presentation of percepts occurs.

~(name redacted)

Hi (name redacted),

“If the second quote is correct (and I agree it is), then the first quote must be incorrect. If the photo of what is projected onto the retina must be identical to the photo of the field of perception, then that would mean there can be no affect on perception from the state of the neurological system between the retina and where the presentation of percepts occurs.”

Yes, that’s right, of course. I probably should say something about that, because if there is damage to the optic nerve (actually a nerve bundle) their might be no image to consciousness at all, but still one on the retina. But there is another way to look at this:

If I’m the one looking at the two “photographs” (and the second of course, is purely imaginary), if I’m blind, even if there is an image on the retina, I’ll see the two photographs as identical, that is, not at all, or if something prevents the cones of my eye from working, I’ll see the two photographs as black and white (even though the image on the retina has a full range of color).

The emphasis of course is on the fact the nervous system does not have to “create” the images of consciousness and the only “process” that is required is “transmission” not “integration,” for example. My illustration is a bit fanciful, so not to be taken too literally, only as an illustration. Your point, however, is important, because the “contextual” nature of perception has never, as far as I know, been recognized explicitly. Kelly attempts to prove perception is valid, but still has the “integrating process” thing in his work, and never gets to the thing you noticed immediately.

Thanks for the comment.

Regi

Hi, Regi,

In your article you wrote:

“Though only the perceivable qualities of existents are available to consciousness, ontologically, all of an existent’s qualities are implied by its perceivable qualities.”

I don’t understand what that means. A table may be solid, but you can’t know this just by looking at it, as you noted in your other article on perception:

“the awareness of a table’s solidity, its surface texture, or other characteristics of a table that cannot be directly seen, if there is such awareness at all when only seeing a table and not touching it, is purely conceptual”

How does perception imply qualities that can’t be perceived by that perception?

Thanks, (name redacted)

Hi (name redacted),

Thank you for the question. It is a good one.

The two quotes are about two different things.

The entire paragaph for the first quote is this:

“More importantly, the ontological insight validates perception. If existents are whatever their qualities are and it is their qualities that are perceived, it is actual existents as they actually exist that are being perceived. Though only the perceivable qualities of existents are available to consciousness, ontologically, all of an existent’s qualities are implied by its perceivable qualities.”

What this means is all we can be directly conscious of about any existent is what is available to our immediate perception, what we can see, or feel, or tatste, or smell, etc. I might hold a rock in my hand and look at it. I see it’s color and shape and feel it’s weight and texture and may even smell the “earthy rocky” smell it has. All of those things I directly perceive are because of the nature of a rock, it’s chemical composition, crystalline structure, which determine it’s weight and how it will reflect light to be the color it is. Those attributes, of course, I must discover conceptually, by studying chemistry, and physics, but they are already implied in what I can directly perceive of the rock. If the chemical structure were different, if it were comprised of different elements, or had a different structure what I would be able to perceive would be different–it would have a different color, weight, texture, or be different in some other way. I cannot know any of those physical characteristics that require physics or chemistey directly from perception, but when I do finally know them, I will be able to see that is why the rock is perceived the way it is.

The second quote, “the awareness of a table’s solidity, its surface texture, or other characteristics of a table that cannot be directly seen, if there is such awareness at all when only seeing a table and not touching it, is purely conceptual,” is actually part of a criticism of Peikoff’s contention that you are aware of a table’s “solidity” merely by seeing it.

You do not know that merely by seeing it, of course. However, if the table were not solid, it would look differently, so the solidity is implied–the discovery of the fact that is implied by its appearance (and other sensory information) is by means of rational inquirey and investigation.

I hope this answers your question, but if not, please feel free to enquire further.

Regi