Order, Universals, and Hylomorphism

I see I asked the right question about order.

“So when I speak of order, I do so in terms of hylomorphism …” you said.

Now this is a term that some are not going to be familiar with, I think. I’ll come to your explanation of what it means, but first I want to give a little philosophical background into this concept, because it lies at the heart of all of philosophy, though I do not agree with Rand, who said it is “philosophy’s central issue,” referring to the issue of universals. [Foreword, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Page 1.]

Beginning With Plato

While the question of universals is older than Plato, the concept as used today, originated with Plato’s forms. Plato viewed the material world of our experience as a, “shadow world,” and all the things in it representatives of “ideal” or “essential” existences (archetypes), which he called forms. For every attribute and property, that is universal, found in this world there is a form.

The existences in this world are what they are because of their “participation” in those forms and are “particulars” of them. For example, all chairs are chairs because they “participate” in the “ideal” chair form and all butterflies are butterflies because they “participate” in the “ideal”butterfly form.

It is very important to understand that Plato considered his forms as real things. This is referred to as Platonic Realism. Realism in philosophy is derived from Platonic Realism, and may be the single most damaging concept in the history of philosophy—it continues to plague philosophy to this day.

Continuing With Aristotle

Perhaps the most serious mistake made by Plato was in attempting to solve the, “problem of universals,“metaphysically. Aristotle essentially rejected Plato’s forms but continued the mistake of attempting to solve the problem metaphysically.

Aristotle’s used the notion of form, though his version of forms was not the same as Plato’s. There is no agreement about some terms Aristotle uses, and these are my best understanding of what he means:

Matter—by matter Aristotle does not mean what a physicist would mean today; Aristotle seems to mean only “that which is” or “being” or “existent,” without any specific attributes.

Substance—by substance Aristotle apparently means anything material; but, since the ultimate meaning of matter is only “being” or “ existent,“substance would only mean anything that exists, but it is clear he only means entities (not poems or his troy or guilt—which also exist), which include the kinds of things (e.g. copper, water, salt) we would call substances. Every substance has a unique essence.

Essence—by essence Aristotle means, “the essence of a thing is what it is said to be in respect of itself.” I think the best way to say what Aristotle means is essence is whatever a thing is, in terms of its attributes or properties, without which it would not be that thing, whatever other attributes or properties a thing might have (called accidentals). The concept of essence then, for a red thing, is “redness,” and for a rock, is “rockness” and for a man, is “manness.” These may be defined, such as man as “rational animal,” but the essence is the manness itself.

Form—by form Aristotle meant that which when combined with matter resulted in a substance of a specific kind. Remembering that by substance Aristotle means an entity, it follows that form determines a things essence, that is, form is what “makes” a thing what it is. The “process” or “action” of combining form with matter, Aristotle called hylomorphism.

Aristotle’s own description of the meaning of form is interesting, because it seems at first glance, unremarkable. “… when a lump of bronze comes to be enformed with the shape of Hermes [a form], a statue of Hermes comes into existence. When this same bronze is later melted and recast as a statue of Domitian, then the Hermes statue goes out of existence and a statue of Domitian [a different form] comes into existence. … We speak of the lump or quantity of bronze as continuing through the entire process.” This explanation was meant to distinguish between essence and accident, but also describes what form is. But it is important here to point out, the bronze, in whatever “shape” it takes as a statue, is also a substance hylomorphized by combining the form (brassness) with matter.

According to Aristotle, in order for this hylomorphization to take place, both matter and form must pre-exist. That means that form must exist independently of the entities of which it is the form, or, in other words, form like matter has real existence. Aristotle attempted to escape Platonic Realism, which regarded forms as universals, by insisting universals only pertained to actual entities with the same essence, and that apart from actual existences did not (like forms) exist. The distinction in modern terms would be, Aristotle regarded universals as strictly epistemological, and forms as strictly metaphysical, for example, Aristotle emphasized that universals can be predicated of many things, but only as ideas. While this is a definite improvement on Plato, as a cure for philosophy, did not take.

Aquinas, Lapsing Into Realism

Rand correctly gives Aquinas (1225-1274) credit for reintroducing Aristotle to philosophy. Unfortunately, Platonic Realism had dominated the philosophy of the schoolmen, and while professing to reject Platonic Realism, Aquinas actually reintroduced it in its “modern” form.

“According to the position of Thomas [Aquinas], which is known as moderate realism, the form or the universal may be said to exist in three ways: in God, in things, and in the mind. [Emphasis mine.] “To Aquinas, the universal was still more than a mere name; it corresponded to an ontological fact; the definition of the universal reproduces the essence of the things.”

According to Aquinas, “everything has two principles that explains its being, essence and existence,“which is nothing more than Aristotelian or even Platonic hylomorphism of form (essence) and matter (existence), which, despite all protestations to the contrary, is philosophical realism.

Whether Aquinas was unaware that realism had already been demolished by an early contemporary is unknown, but after Aquinas, all philosophy influenced by the Scholastics were realists of some form or another, and the only real opposition to realism came from the even worse German idealists. Aquinas might have reintroduced Aristotle to philosophy, but his own contribution to philosophy was a variety of Platonic Realism which destroyed all philosophy which it influenced.

An Individualist in the Midst of Scholasticism Mysticism

While the scholastics were busy perpetuating Platonic Realism, there was one philosopher who saw through the whole of that mystic nonsense. Ayn Rand described the kind of man, (though not this particular one) who becomes the lone philosopher who goes against the current of his age to create something truly new, true, and original.

“Men have been taught that it is a virtue to agree with others. But the creator is the man who disagrees. Men have been taught that it is a virtue to swim with the current. But the creator is the man who goes against the current. Men have been taught that it is a virtue to stand together. But the creator is the man who stands alone.” [For the New Intellectual,—The Fountainhead, “The Soul Of An Individualist”]

This man went against the current of the entire history of philosophy to his day and stood alone. His name was Peter Abelard (1079—1142). “Abelard is notorious for his claim that universals are nothing but words, a thesis he defends by arguing at length that ontological realism about universals is incoherent.” “From his antirealist arguments, Abelard concludes that there are no (nonsemantic) real … universal(s) whether as things in their own right or as real constituents of or in things. Instead, everything that exists is individual, or, as Abelard sometimes puts it, ‘personally distinct.’”

Abelard did describe a kind of hylomorphism of “form” and “matter,” but “matter” for Abelard is only the “stuff” (e.g. bricks or wood) and “substances” (e.g. copper or iron) things are made of, and “form” only the arrangement or shape of that material. There is nothing ontological about Abelard’s hylomorphism. In this, he anticipated Locke and Rand by about 400 and 700 years respectively.

Ridding Philosophy of Metaphysical Lumber

I have already written an article explaining why the very concept of universals is mistaken, (which is badly in need of rewriting, but fundamentally correct). I do not intend to summarize that article, but to simply state three principles first explicated in various ways by Abelard, Locke, and Rand, that sweep away the entire mystic edifice of all variations of ontological Realism from Plato to Aquinas. Those five principles are:

1. Ontologically, only entities exist.

2. Attributes exist only as attributes of entities and cannot exist in any sense independently of the entities of which they are attributes.

3. Ontologically, essence consists of all attributes necessary for entities to be what they are, which is all its attributes as an individual, or all those attributes members of a class must have to be members of that class.

4. Epistemologically, things are identified by means of their attributes.

5. Epistemologically, a concept subsumes by identifying all thing’s with the same essence.

[If I expand this to an article, which I’m tempted to do, I will expand on these principles, because they are basis for the relationship between ontology and epistemology.]

The Plague Continues

Despite my own contention, that, “the concept of universals must be relegated to the trash heap of junk concepts along with phlogiston, animal magnetism, and ectoplasm,” the concept not only persists, but in its worst realist (platonic) from. Interestingly, it is promoted primarily by religionists, especially in their apologetics (defense of their religious concepts) and, when trying to repudiate the philosophy of Ayn Rand.

Two examples only available as books, not online, are John W. Robbins’ s Without a Prayer: Ayn Rand and the Close of Her System and Scott Ryan’s Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality: A Critique of Ayn Rand’s Epistemology [which used to be online]. Michael Huemer’s Why I am Not an Objectivist is online. Other online examples are, “Objectivist Epistemology: Strengths and Weaknesses,” and Is Objectivism Merely a Disguised Materialism?, which are all pretty poor.

Regi

Hi Bill, Kevin, everyone,

Just wanted to say, I am not trying to move this thread from it’s main objective, which is primarily yours, that is, a defense of a rational basis for accepting the premises of theism, though I know my last long post might not seem to be on subject. It was entirely meant to address your own avowed meaning of “order” which you suggested can be explained in terms of hylomorphism, particularly Aquinas’ version which puts “form” squarely in the mind of God. The point of my long post was to demonstrate the philosophical origin of hylomorphism and its relationship to Platonic Realism, the only difference being that Plato places his “forms” in some mystic never-never land, and Aquinas puts his forms in the mind of God.

The significance of this, which of course I regard a mistake, is illustrated by another comment you made in the original post I was answering. My intention is not to convince you your argument is wrong, but to explain why an Objectivist or I cannot agree with your argument because that philosophy (O’ism) and mine are completely at odds with it. You said:

“For instance, there is no logical reason why the properties of each proton must be identical or even if that were so, why each proton should interact with any other particle in a uniform way.”

I addressed this argument earlier, but I evidently did not make it clear what my objection was. I see three mistakes here.

If I may speak metaphorically, the picture you seem to paint of protons is like things discovered in the sub-atomic forest, like acorns dropped from nuclear oaks which one discovers lying on the forest floor, which, surprise surprise, all have the same attributes, and, wonder of wonders, all behave the same way.

1. Protons are not like physical objects, discovered, and in fact are not truly physical entities. They are actually scientific models used to explain certain chemical and nuclear phenomena. Whether protons can actually be said to be components of anything depends on what one means by components—they certainly are not like bricks being components of a brick house. Speaking of them as components is, itself, more metaphorical than actual, because despite the “picture” we have of them, science now considers all subatomic particles as somewhat amorphous. But even if protons were like the submicroscopic hard round balls we picture, they are still not “discovered,” in the usual sense, they are imaginative creations that explain certain aspects of the behavior of atoms. The properties we ascribe to them are the properties that fit that explanation, which brings me to the next point.

2. Any thing is what it is because of the properties it has. If anything has attributes different from those ascribed to any “kind” of thing, it is not one of those things, but obviously some other kind of thing. Anything that does not have the properties of a proton, would not be a proton, it would be something else. In this case, it is you who have reversed the order of things—one does not discover protons and subsequently discover its properties, one discover things with different properties, and those with the same properties it names protons, or electrons, or neutrons, etc.

3. When you say, “there is no logical reason why … each proton should interact with any other particle in a uniform way,” it contradicts the nature of cause itself. There are two notions of cause, the most common (and the one invoked by Hume) is “event driven,” usually expresses as cause and effect, meaning one event causes another. Objectivism and my philosophy understand cause as “entity driven,” that is, events are caused by the behavior of entities, and the behavior entities is determined by their nature, that is, by the properties which those entities have. It is expressed: “the same kind of entity will always behave in the same way in the same context.” In fact, how an entity behaves in any context is one of its properties, and if any two entities behave differently in the same context, they are different kinds of entities.

This last also addresses what seems to be the basis of a common question that permeates your argument, the question of why something is what it is. Though phrased in different ways, it is, “but why is a proton a proton and not an electron” or “why is the universe the one it is and not some other universe?” The assumption in these questions is that things have causes, but that assumption is based on the “cause and effect” theory of cause, which Hume demonstrated is unfounded. It is the flaw in almost every theory of inductive reason.

Things do not have causes. Events do, and their cause is entities, but they are not “cause” in the sense that (entity) A causes (event) B. An event (any event) is only the action of entities, and the nature of the event is determined by what the entities do, and what the entities do is determined by the nature of the entities. In that light, we can say, the nature of any event is caused by the entities whose action is determined by their nature and whose action comprises the event.

Related to the question of “why” things exist, as though they had causes, is “what is the purpose of things that exist,” which assumes everything has a purpose. But purpose presupposes a being capable of having purposes. In this world, the only things that have purposes are those created by man, because man is capable of having purposes. (While we speak of the purpose of a bird nest or a beaver lodge it is only the function those things serve those creatures instinct, of course, not an intended purpose.)

Trees, and rocks, and rivers do not have a purpose unless men discover or create one for those things. A mountain or an ocean does not have a purpose, they just are. To assume such things, or the universe itself, must have a purpose assumes someone has a purpose for them—but there is no basis for that assumption. To make that assumption (the universe has a purpose) assumes the existence of a purposer, without which there could not be a purpose. To ask the question, “what is the purpose of the universe” makes the assumption, “the universe must have a purposer.” The question is based on the assumption of the very thing the question is meant as an argument for. This, as you know, is the common fallacy of “begging the question.”

There is another approach you might take, however. Even though there is no basis for the assumption, as a mere experimental conjecture, you could assume the existence of a purposer (and, therefore, that the universe has a purpose) to see where that would logically take you. This is a valid rational process, so long as it is explicitly maintained as a hypothesis. Interestingly, much of quantum mechanics was established by this method, the mathematical part of which, at least, seems correct.

I don’t think the method will yield the results you would like, but it might at least lead to some interesting discussion. However, I don’t mean to discourage you from pursuing your own arguments or defence. Just pointing out why, so far, they are going to be unconvincing to anyone holding Objectivist or Firehammeran views of philosophy.

Regi

Hi Bill, Kevin,

First, let me say, my last was written very late, and I see I was not as careful as I ought to have been to make my meaning clear. For example, your reference to my statement:

“If the universe is all that exists, there can be nothing outside it that is its reason for existing, and thus no “purpose,” for it existence.”

…to which you said,

“For example, you define the universe as all that exists to explain why it can’t have a purpose.”

That was not my point, but it is my fault it seems like it. I was not trying to prove by that statement the universe does not have a purpose, only that it’s purpose, if it were to have one, could not be “outside” the universe, since I’m using it to mean everything there is. I do not, however, object to the use of the word “reality” to mean, “everything there is,” and “universe”to mean all of which we are conscious, directly or indirectly. What I would demand evidence for, however, is that there is any existence of which we cannot in any way be conscious, and if there is, how we could possibly know of its existence.

Then you said, “Right, [an existent’s “essential” attributes determine what “accidental” attributes are possible to it.] which if realism is false, then all attributes of an entity are metaphysically accidental and essence is nothing but an epistemological construct.”

The reason I will not use the words “accidental” and “essential” in my epistemology is just because of the mistake those words have caused you to make. “Accidentals,” which Aristotle first described, does not mean, as you imply, that which happens without discernable reason, like an automobile accident. “Accidental” attributes or properties or qualities are those of an existent that can be, (and must be) different, if considered a member of a class, from other members of that same class, or, for an individual, those attributes or properties that can and do change over time. For example, there are attributes of a dog a dog must have to be a dog, without which it would be something else—those attributes are essential to a dogs nature as a dog. But every dog must have some attribute or attributes that are unigue to it in order for it to be a uniques existent. No two dogs can be identical in every attribute, else they would not be two dogs. (If you have understtood this much, you might begin to be suspicious of your “all protons have the same attributes” argument, by the way.) Those attributes that differentiate inviduals within a class of existents, or those which change over time for individuals Aristotle called accidentals. Since those “accidental” attributes are actual ontological attributes, there is nothing epistemological about them at all.

Epistimologically,essential verses accidental attributes, is only the identification of the ontological facts the determine any existents nature, individually, or as a member of a class of existents.

Kevin, I really liked this, because I know it is an attempt to express what is always implied by the “realist” argument: “There does not need to be an ontological “over-reality” to explain mere identity, does there?” Of course that is exactly what the Platonic realist does believe—it is not enough for the realist that a thing is what it is and has the attributes it has, but makes the baseless assumption, there must be something else that “causes” it to have the attributes it has. The fact is, in most cases, philosophically, why a thing has the attributes it has is a confused question.

Regi

Hi Bill, Kevin,

Ah, you have come close, Bill:

“Perhaps your position is similar to that of the property dualists who claim that all entities are physical but not necessarily their attributes.”

Very close, except that in my ontology there is no dualism. The properties of all existents are perfectly natural, and all that exists is material. Only those attributes of the natural (material existents), which can be perceived directly are what we call the “physical” and are the proper subjects of the physical sciences. The “physical” attributes or properties of existents can all be reduced to position, motion, and acceleration. Some material existents have properties (or attributes) beyond the physical ones, namely, “life,”“consciousness,” and “volition,” but they are just as much natural attributes as position, motion, and acceleration; however those attributes cannot be directly perceived.

Since all possible attributes of material existents includes “life,”“consciousness,” “volition,” and the “physical” attributes, noting “functions beyond those [physical] constraints,” since those constraints only exist where the attributes of “life,” “consciousness,” and “volition,” are absent, that is, in those existents that are only “non-living” entities. All matter is potentially volitional, but only those entities which have all possible attributes of the material, “consciousness,” “life,” and “physical,“can be “volitional” as well. The physically determined aspects of the material universe only pertain to those aspects of it that are not living and the “physical” aspects of living organism.

Now I thank you for recognizing this:

“I haven’t ever heard you argue twaddle like emergence.”

You have no idea how much that absurd concept annoys me. It is the very same mistake, with regard to consciousness, as is made in political/economics that believes that complexity actually changes the nature of things. In both cases it implies that a true principle can be violated if there is “enough” of something: in the case of consciousness, if there are enough unconscious circuits (as though multiplying 0 by a sufficiently large number actually produces anything but zero); in the case of economics, if there are enough people and complexity in business/economic factors. The first is the basis of the absurd belief that AI can produce consciousness; the second is the belief the complexity of a society’s economy justifies regulating it, even though regulation of an economy, in principle, is always harmful.

I think you might be able to understand my position if you understand I do not regard life, consciousness, and volition, as things, but attributes, and that they are possible attributes of all existence (reality, or real existents, if you like), but not necessary. Every existent might have those attributes, but most do not, and those that do not are the merely physical, but a subset of the highest order of existents, the living, conscious, and volitional.

(I am quite aware I am very derelict in my responses, and will try very hard in the next day or two to catch up.)

Regi

Hi Bill,

Do you still not know me after all this time to accuse me of patronization? I do not care that you do it, but if you think that is what I’m doing, you really do not understand what I am doing.

I have no means of dealing with others, you included, except by reason. That is always my only purpose or method. Reconsider what I said that you\ think is partonizing:

“No two dogs can be identical in every attribute, else they would not be two dogs. (If you have understtood this much, you might begin to be suspicious of your “all protons have the same attributes” argument, by the way.)”

My point was only that you have been making much of the fact that all protons and other sub-atomic entities have identical attributes; but, if they are identical in every way, they either do not exist at all, or are all the same existent—which is obviously absurd. So, then, what are the distinguishing Jattributes (properties or characteristics) of protons? Since there must be Jsuch distinguishing (or differentiating) attributes, how can they be identical. (There is a correct answer to the last, but I leave that for you to discover.)

Do you really think this is patronization? You know me Bill. Is that my method?

Regi

Hi, Regi.

All matter is potentially volitional, but only those entities which have all possible attributes of the material, “consciousness,” “life,” and “physical,” can be “volitional” as well.

A hylozoist! As I said, your comments on this subject are very interesting, more interesting than what I have read by Rand on it. A question comes to mind.

If by your reckoning the attribute of life, consciousness, and volition are latent in matter, I don’t take that to mean you believe that given the right circumstances a rock could come to life, ponder the nature of the universe, and make a decision about what it’s going to do for the day. I suspect that on your view matter must be structured as an organism for the attribute of life to come into existence for that entity.

Of course, that physical structure is extremely complex and it does degrade over time. Sufficiently degraded the entity will lose the attribute of life, which is how organisms become corpses. However, is that physical structure, once it comes into being and so long as it is in functioning order, sufficient for the realization of the attribute of life? For instance, if I were to accurately build the structure of a canine organism molecule by molecule, would that upon completion come to life as a dog?

Regards, Bill

Hi Bill,

No, not exactly a hylozoist! I do think life is inseparable from matter

“I suspect that on your view matter must be structured as an organism for the attribute of life to come into existence for that entity.”

Sort of. “Matter must be structured as an organism for the attribute of life to be.

“For instance, if I were to accurately build the structure of a canine organism molecule by molecule, would that upon completion come to life as a dog?”

Well, no; first because you cannot do it, because, second, life only comes from life. It cannot be “started up” from the “outside,” so to speak.

I think I should clarify, since “all matter is potentially volitional” is both awkward and not precisely correct. What I should have said is “volition is a possible attribute of any matter, which has all the other possible attributes of the material, ‘consciousness,’ ‘life,’ and ‘physical,’ ….”

What can I say. I was tired.

Regi

Hi, Regi.

I asked:

For instance, if I were to accurately build the structure of a canine organism molecule by molecule, would that upon completion come to life as a dog?

You answered:

Well, no; first because you cannot do it, because, second, life only comes from life. It cannot be “started up” from the “outside,” so to speak.

I didn’t think you’d agree that life could be “built”. I did recall our agreement in a discussion with others about abiogenesis that only life begets life. Would it be fair to summarize your view as follows:

1. Life always existed;

2. However, life only exists as an attribute of a physical entity;

3. But life, and the related attributes of consciousness and volition, in turn are not reducible to physical attributes and so their operation is not governed by the laws of physics?

Regards, Bill

Hi Bill,

You asked:

Would it be fair to summarize your view as follows:

1. Life always existed;

2. However, life only exists as an attribute of a physical entity;

3> But life, and the related attributes of consciousness and volition, in turn are not reducible to physical attributes and so their operation is not governed by the laws of physics?

Yes, that’s a fair summing up, with some question in my own mind of what “always existed” means in [1]. Remember I regard life as an attribute (not a thing), and it’s “always existing” might be in a form we cannot imagine, some kind of “seed” for example—which I’m not suggesting and rather doubt, just illustrating that life could have a nature we cannot yet identify.

Also, as clarification, this is exactly right: “But life, and the related attributes of consciousness and volition, in turn are not reducible to physical attributes and so their operation [nature] is not governed by the laws of physics?” I would add, life requires the physical attributes and while not itself governed by them, the physical aspects of the organism are governed by them, and the life process cannot cause those physical attributes (determined by the laws of physics) to be violated. The life process both uses and depends on those attributes.

Here’s a thought. The physical does not giver rise to life, consciousness, and volition, because they are additional attributes of physical existents (organisms), with their own principles over and above the physical, but they are limited by the physical, in the sense that none can cause the physically impossible. The other attributes are limiting and or limited in the same way. Consciousness, for example, cannot “do” (have anything about its nature) that is not possible to a living organism. [Not easy to think of an example. Can you? Only the classic continuation of consciousness after death not being possible—which I doubt you could agree with.] Volition cannot “do” (have anything about its nature) that is not possible to a conscious organism. [Imagining a color not part of the visible spectrum, comes to mind, but is problematic. Better would be any form of “psychokinetics.” One can volitionally bend a spoon by taking it in his hands and bending it, but cannot directly will a spoon to bend, simply because volition pertains only to the organism it is the volition of, and therefore only the conscious, living, and physical aspects of that organism.]

These limitations exclude the possibility of all so-called psychic phenomena, unless what are called psychic phenomena were really physical phenomena. But this get’s us a bit far afield from the purpose of this thread (unless you think of “prayer” or “miracles” as psychic possibilities in the broadest sense). Be glad to move this subject somewhere else if anyone is interested.

Regi

Hi Bill,

I think we have pretty much covered this much of your view vs. mine, which has never I think been that far apart. If I may sum up where we are:

We essentially agree that the physical is all that we are directly conscious, is that which the physical sciences study, and is goverened by the laws of physics; that life, consciousness, and volition are not reducible to the physical and therefore not governed by the physical laws; and that an organism is the physical plus life (and possibly consciousness and volition as well)

Our main difference, which is significant, is that you regard life as (or the result of) a “something” additional to the physical aspects of an organism, I regard life as an “attribute” additional to the physical attributes of an organism. You regard an organism as an amalgum of two things, the natural (physical) and the supernatural (soul or spirit); I regard an organism as another level of natural existence, all the _physical _attributes plus the additional life attribute. We both agree the consciousness and volition are only possible to organism and it is the life of the organism to which they pertain.

Would you say that was a fair summing up?

We can certainly address any additional differences you see, but if you are satisfied we are in, ah, “agreement about our differencs,” there is something you mentioned long ago, I wonder if you would be interested in. It’s from some other threads.

After quoting you from here: http://usabig.com/wowbbforums/view_topic.php?id=483&forum_id=6&highlight=into+the+abyss

However, there are also those extraordinary souls who can look into the abyss, that pit of human ignorance, and know no fear. I can’t. I look there and fear without God there is no foundation for good and beauty; that there can be nothing that matters. I responded here: http://usabig.com/wowbbforums/view_topic.php?id=476&forum_id=6&highlight=into+the+abyss

I do not regard the unknown as something dark and frightening. It is the opposite to an abyss for me. The unknown is nothing in itself, but it represents to me all that I live for. It represents all there is I have yet to experience, to learn, to achieve and to discover. It is the other side of every mountain I have yet not seen, every forest that is yet unexplored, every wonder of this world and existence I have yet to discover. It is every opportunity of the future, everything worth working for, the source of that which makes life an adventure worth living. The unknown is mine to discover, to know, and to make mine. I know there is a difference of expression, you referring to “human ignorance,” and I referring to “the unknown,” but the “abyss” must be whatever it is humans are ignorant of, not the ignorance itself. You can’t peer into that.

My interest is not in resolving our difference about how we look at the unknown, however, but a thought I have had for a very long time, that you seem to have verified.

You characterized those, “who can look into the abyss, that pit of human ignorance, and know no fear,” as, “extraordinary souls.” I’m sure you mean by “souls” only “individuals,” but you can correct me about that if I’m mistaken. Now I take your use of, “extraordinary,” to mean having something exceptional about their nature that makes them able to look at the unknown without fear—but even if that is your meaning, it at least implies they are also extraordinary in the sense they are a rare kind of human being. I happen to believe that is true.

I think that most people, like you, “can’t,” look into the abyss without fear. Most, like you, “look there and fear without God there is no foundation …; that there can be nothing that matters.” That this is the condition of most people, I also believe is true.

Historians and religionists have always pointed out that almost every culture and society in history has had some kind of religion. It is often attributed to some fundamental need of man for a belief in a higher being or presence or intelligence. I think your “fear from looking into the abyss,” is, however, the real answer for the prevalence of a belief in some sort of supernatural explanation of things.

… I have more to say about this, but will first see if you are interested in pursuing this. This is, after all, your thread.

Regi

Hi, Regi.

Your summing up is fair, though I’ll tweak this: >>You regard an organism as an amalgum of two things, the natural (physical) and the supernatural (soul or spirit); I regard an organism as another level of natural existence, all the _physical _attributes plus the additional life attribute.<<

I believe all entities that exist within the universe are substances composed of matter and form. Form is the principle of organization, which orders matter into a substance and specifies its attributes, and matter is the principle of extension, which gives a substance a spatio-temporal body and individuates it from all other substances. The form of an organism is a soul, and the soul of the human organism is rational and immortal.

Though I am fond of the word “thing”, I would hesitate to call form a thing only to avoid the connotation that it has physicality. Only by means of the dualism of matter and form can I understand the fundamental difference between the quantitative and the qualitative attributes of an entity and why the former is analyzable by means of science and the latter can only be understood aesthetically.

Regards, Bill

Hi Bill,

I really do not know what this means:

“Only by means of the dualism of matter and form can I understand the fundamental difference between the quantitative and the qualitative attributes of an entity and why the former is analyzable by means of science and the latter can only be understood aesthetically.”

In particular, how do you distinguish between an entity’s “quantitative” and “qualitative” attributes. This looks suspiciously like a symantic mixup to me.

Can you give me examples of an entity’s “quantitative” vs. “qualitative”attributes?

I also don’t know what “understood aesthetically,” means. It doesn’t look right to me, but maybe I’ve misunderstood your intention. What does “understanding” have to do with “aesthetics?”

Regi

Hi, Regi.

A quantitative attribute is one that can be measured. A qualitative one cannot. It either exists or it does not. It is simple; that is, it has no parts. So it is unanalyzable. It is because of this difference between quantitative attributes and qualitative ones that the former is the subject of science, the latter aesthetics. Scientific knowledge is foundational. It is reducible to fundamental principles from which we can deduce the truth about particulars. Aesthetic knowledge is coherent; we know the truth of it from its beauty—i.e., its harmony with all else we know to be true. However, lacking the foundation of scientific knowledge, it lacks its certainty.

As for an example of quantitative and qualitative attributes, my attributes of height and weight are quantitative. My consciousness and volition are qualitative. More important my essence, that set of attributes that identify me as a human being as opposed to a dog or cat, is qualitative. My essence is not measurable. It cannot be quantified. Therefore, it cannot be known by scientific means. Let me make this point by proposing a thought experiment: How would a computer be programmed to distinguish a dog from a cat? A computer functions only from quantitative inputs. So unless the essence-dog and the essence-cat can be quantified, no computer can identify any member of those species as such.

Regards, Bill

Hi Bill,

I must say you have completely mystified me. I confess I really can make nothing of what you have said. For example:

“A quantitative attribute is one that can be measured. A qualitative one cannot. It either exists or it does not. It is simple; that is, it has no parts. So it is unanalyzable.”

First, “it either exists or it does not,” is true of everything, entities, attributes, relationships—everything. A thing either is or isn’t. Anything else violates the law of excluded middle. It cannot be this that distinguishes between quantitative and qualitative attributes.

Then you say, “It is simple; that is, it has no parts.” But what “parts” does “red” have. If you mean it has attributes, then everything has attributes, including attributes. You use “life” as an example of a qualitative attribute. Does life have no attributes? Certainly we analyze life in terms of its relationships to an organism, to the other non-physical attributes, consciousness and volition. I’m afraid I miss your whole point here.

This an even bigger mystery to me:

“Aesthetic knowledge is coherent; we know the truth of it from its beauty …”

I do not mean to be flip here, but seriously, what would “incoherent’knowledge be? If all knowledge is coherent, this says nothing, except as a redundancy.

But there is a bigger problem here, and that is what is meant by “beauty.“Aesthetics is the least well established of all branches of philosophy (if it is even a legitimate branch of philosophy, about which I have some doubts).

Here is the fundamental problem as I see it. Beauty is the name of a particular kind of perceptual experience men have. I listen to a piece of music, or see a scene, or read a passage of prose or poetry that give me a particular experience of pleasure I call beautiful, and since similar music, scenes, and literature gives others a sense of pleasure they describe similarly to mine, we assume beauty is some characteristic of the things that give us that experience. In fact, the experience is our own and comes entirely from our ability to appreciate something in the nature of those things we evaluate as good or pleasureable.

There are people who do not have that sense of beauty, however. In some cases the reason is physiological (the tone deaf or totally deaf do not experience beauty in music). Similar beauty-“deafness” apparently is common to other experiences. Most people do not appreciate the potentially profound beauty of poetry, for example.

My point is that beauty is not an attribute of anything, anymore than funniness (which depends on our sense of humor) or sadness (which depends on our sense of pathos) or embarrassment (which depends on our sense of propriety) or awe (which depends on our ability to appreciate the exceptional) are. The experience which we call “beautiful” is our emotional response to that sense in us that [ready for this?] appreciates directly whatever reminds us this is a wonderful world of infinite possiblity for enjoyment.

I’ll address the computer metaphor in another post.

Now I’ve admitted I may have misunderstood you, so will not mind a good straightening out if it is in order. Otherwise I hope you find these comments interesting, if not valuable.

Regi

Hi Bill,

I’m afraid I’ve been a bit remiss in responding as well, having also been very busy with matters that just could not be put aside. No need to apologize and I look forward to what you are planning—but please do not feel pressed and do it at your own pace.

I also promised you more concerning your computer analogy. I do not think the matter is essential, but do want to address it briefly. You can decide how significant it is.

“How would a computer be programmed to distinguish a dog from a cat? A computer functions only from quantitative inputs. So unless the essence-dog and the essence-cat can be quantified, no computer can identify any member of those species as such.”

This seems to me mistaken on several levels. A computer could certainly distinguish between a dog and cat. In this day and age, especially with some of the sophisticated signal analysis programs available, a computer with the appropriate audio and camera inputs could easily distinguish between dogs and cats, and it would be by means of the visual and audio aspects their identities.

The mistake here is, “A computer functions only from quantitative inputs,” if you mean by “quantitative,” only numbers. A computer, however, is actually “conceptual” (i.e. logical) first, and “mathematical” second; just as it is “analog” first, and “digital” second. Electronically, a computer is, as all electronics are, analog. It is only by selecting specific levels (switching levels) of the analog behavior of the discrete transistors, the behavior appears to be “digital.” The same is true with basic digital logic. The “and”gates and “or” gates that make up all computers are not “mathematical,” they are “logical,” and can be described by means of truth tables, etc.

It takes a great many logic gates to produce a design that can even do very simple math, like addition, subtraction, or even simple counting. It’s true the behavior is discrete—but surprise, surprise, so is all human conceptualization. A concept is the identification of an existent or class of existents by means of—a word—that is—a discrete unit.

Do you think the words “cat” and “dog” cannot have meaning to someone who cannot “see” a dog or cat, a blind person, perhaps, or one who is just never exposed to one? That would mean we could never identify anything we were not personally acquainted with, wouldn’t it? If, however, we can, by description, provide someone knowledge of something they are not personally acquainted with, it becomes obvious that our knowledge or identification of a thing is not by means of some “mystic” essence only our “aesthetic sense” is capable of being conscious of, but that a thing’s “essence” is simply the sum of its attributes.

Regi

Hi, Regi.

I wrote: > How would a computer be programmed to distinguish a dog from a cat? A computer functions only from quantitative inputs. So unless the essence-dog and the essence-cat can be quantified, no computer can identify any member of those species as such.

You replied:

This seems to me mistaken on several levels. A computer could certainly distinguish between a dog and cat. In this day and age, especially with some of the sophisticated signal analysis programs available, a computer with the appropriate audio and camera inputs could easily distinguish between dogs and cats, and it would be by means of the visual and audio aspects their identities.

Nope. For a computer to do as you say, there must be a quantitative attribute (or combination of them) that all dogs possess but no cats do and vice versa. This is not a matter of a system of identification that is accurate most of the time or even nearly all the time. A dog is a dog, not probably a dog. Not even DNA analysis is sufficient in this regard.

In other words, what distinguishes all dogs from all cats is not a marker that can be objectively identified (and so analyzed by a computer) but rather the form of a dog that all dogs have and no cat does.

Regards, Bill