Memory

by Reginald Firehammer

The scientific description of memory is interesting, because it is consistent with (does not contradict) the philosophical description of memory, although the two are (and must be) distinct. A brief glance at the scientific view of memory, reveals memory is divided into three aspects, sensory memory, short-term memory, and long-term memory. Sensory memory, according to this view, acts as a kind of buffer for “sensory” stimuli (perceptual qualities) which will be stored in short-term memory depending on one’s attention to them. “Information,” from short term memory may then be stored in long-term memory by means of rehearsal or repetition.

Long-term memory is further divided into two aspects, semantic (for storage of verbal data) and episodic (for storage of events and experiences data). There is something odd about this description of long-term memory, however. If all that is stored in sensory memory is perceptual qualities, and all that is stored in short-term memory is that same perceptual qualities one has paid attention to and all that is stored in long-term memory are those same perceptual qualities from short-term memory one has rehearsed or repeated, where to memories of event and memory of language and facts and principles come from? This same question will appear in the philosophical description of memory, and the answer is a clue to the nature of volition.

[Two points need to be made about memory from the scientific perspective. First, memory is not consciousness, nor part of consciousness in any way, and certainly not part of any psychological pseudo-concept such as the “subconscious.” Memory is simply a means of recording or storing something, and what it stores is “material” that can be perceived when recalled from memory, but so long as it is not recalled, it is just a “resource” for consciousness. Secondly, memory is entirely physical, or physiological. It is quite likely that science will one day be able to determine exactly how memory works, in the same way it will be able to determine how the nervous system works, which it has already discovered a great deal about.]

Memory, the Philosophical View

There are difficulties with the structure of memory and its function as science views it, but there are three aspects of the scientific view that are important philosophically, the necessity of attention, the significance of rehearsal or repetition, and the fact only percepts, or perceptual qualities are stored in memory.

None of these depend on science for their validity. Science does not (because it cannot) make the very important point which only philosophy can make, that all that is available for storage in memory is whatever is in consciousness—we cannot remember (truly—because there are “false memories”) what we have never been conscious of. Since consciousness is our direct perception of the physical aspects of existence, consciousness consists entirely of percepts or perceptual qualities.

At this point, the same question raised about the scientific view (where do memories of events and concepts come from) must be asked about memory, if all that can be stored are perceptual qualities? The answer is, they are stored by means of perceptual qualities.

I have planned a condensed version of my article Perception, which explains how perception is direct consciousness of entities and events entirely by means of perceptual qualities. [I strongly suggest you read, at least the pertinent parts of that article if you cannot wait for the condensed version]. To store in memory percepts of entities or events it is only necessary to store the perceptual qualities the perception of those entities and events consist of, and that is exactly how they are stored. This, however, does not explain how concepts (ideas, principles, facts, etc.) are stored.

Memory and Epistemology

It is impossible to explain how memory which consists entirely of stored perceptual “data,” and nothing else, is capable of storing such things as concepts, without reference to what concepts are. Because that whole subject is a very large branch of epistemology, I can only provide a very brief explanation that will be filled out when I finally get around to my full epistemology.

Ayn Rand described a concept this way:

… a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete, which will differentiate it from all other concretes and from all other concepts. This is the function performed by language. Language is a code of visual-auditory symbols that serves the psycho-epistemological function of convening concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes.

[Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. “2. Concept-Formation”]

Though, there is a very bad mistake in this passage, it does point out the nature of the relationship between percepts and concepts. The mistake is an important one, however, and I will write another post to explain it.

Prof. F: On page 16, you refer to words as being themselves concepts. Do you mean that literally? For instance, you say that prepositions are concepts. Do you mean that prepositions stand for concepts? Is this a shorthand way of saying that?

AR: Oh yes, certainly. I have stated that words are perceptual symbols which stand for these products of the mental integrations.

And in case this isn’t clear, I would like to add one thing. Why did I say “perceptual”? Because words are available to us either visually or auditorially. They are given to us in sensory, perceptual form. And by means of grasping them, on the perceptual level, we are able to operate with concepts as single mental units. In other words, every time we think of the concept “table,” we don’t have to add up the sum of all the tables we have seen or visualize them. “Table” as a sound or a visual image is on the perceptual level. Mentally, it stands for that particular integration of concretes which we have called “table.”

So the word is not the concept, but the word is the auditory or visual symbol which stands for a concept. And a concept is a mental entity; it cannot be perceived perceptually. That’s the role played by words.

[Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, “Appendix—The Role of Words.”]

Despite the mistakes, we can now say how concepts are stored in memory, they are stored as “visual-auditory symbols,” which Rand calls “perceptual concrete[s].”

Recall

All that can be stored in memory is perceptual data and all that can be recalled is perceptual data. When we think about consciousness, we first think of our consciousness of what we call the, “external world,” but we know we are conscious of much more than that, but all of our direct perception of the physical world is by means of the nervous system, which are the source perceptual qualities from which the percepts that form are perceptual field are “constructed.” What is stored in memory is from that field.

To recall anything from memory, stored perceptual data must be provided to consciousness, but cannot be provided via the nervous system. Technically, of course, the brain is part of the nervous system, but the means by which the brain provides stored perceptual data to consciousness is unique. The exact physiological events involved are not well understood, but we can observe how it is unique. Our direct conscious perception of the physical world is determined by what is presently stimulating our internal and external nervous system. What stimulates the functions of the brain to provide stored perceptual data to consciousness?

Since there can be no external (to the brain or conscious, e.g. the nervous system) cause which determines what perceptual data from memory will be provided to consciousness, the cause must be internal to either the brain or consciousness itself. If the brain itself determined what it would provide to consciousness from memory, it could have no direct relationship to what is currently in consciousness. Our minds would be a confused mass of percepts combining those from the nervous system and those provided, willy nilly, by the brain. But we know that memories are not provided willy nilly, but always with some relationship to what we are currently conscious of. It is the current content of consciousness at any time that determines what will be recalled from memory. At all times, our consciousness consists of the combined perception of perceptual data from the nervous system and perceptual data from memory—and they are always related.

Some Automatic Processes

When I finally get around to my fuller discussion of epistemology, I will describe the function of recognition, that is an animal’s primary mode of learning, but in man is a kind of preconceptual proto-learning. Recognition is essentially the automatic recall from memory of perceptual data that relates to or is similar to whatever one is presently conscious of, the entire content of consciousness. The process is automatic in both animals and man, but this and some other automatic processes have a unique function in humans.

Emotions, overt behavior, and memory share a common attribute—they are, in all creatures with perceptual consciousness, responses to the content of consciousness. In animals, that response is totally automatic, but in human beings they are not completely automatic.

It is the volitional nature of man that gives him control over his emotions, behavior, and memory. His control over memory and behavior are direct, but only indirect in the case of the emotions, which I will describe in my emotions posting.

Recalling stored perceptual data from memory is controlled by the same means it’s storage is controlled, by attention and repetition. These same functions, attention and repetition, are the means of controlling overt behavior as well. I will explain exactly how these functions work in my initial posting to the volition thread.

This is getting long, so I will describe this in a very general way. Essentially, what is recalled from memory will be whatever is already stored in memory that is similar to what is currently in consciousness. As a simple incomplete example, if we are seeing a tree at the moment, perceptual data of everything similar to a tree (other trees we’ve seen) or parts of a trees (leaves, branches, bark we’ve seen) that we have stored in memory will be recalled from memory—but, only those we attend to will remain in consciousness. This recalling is automatic. The next time we see a tree, all of the same perceptual data recalled last time is recalled, but the data we attended to last time will be more prominent in consciousness. If we repeat this process, always attending to the same recalled data, it soon becomes the only data recalled, and the other related data, if recalled at all, is very tentative.

The process of recall, attention, and repetition is continuous and exteremly rapid. In the early stages of development, a child develops millions of such relationships between the content of consciousness and what will be recalled from memory, especially as it is learning about its own body and immediate environment. The motivation for attention and repetition (why one thing is attended to, and not another) is partly determined by the comfort/discomfort pain/pleasure consciousness, which I will say more about in my emotions post.

Hi, Regi.

Putting memory in the same category as sight, hearing, etc. makes sense. While I have control over what I put in memory, I don’t always have control over what comes out of it. For example, a smell will sometimes evoke an old memory. I did not chose to recall that memory, so I see how it is a percept akin to seeing whatever happened to come into my view.

I also store words in my memory along with the association of each word to a concept. I think I understand how the process works. For example, as a toddler I would see and touch a thing that an adult said was a “table”. I would then perceive a different object that I am also told is a “table”. And again and again. Both the word “table” and my percepts that others associated to that word are stored in my memory. Eventually from those memories I would form a general concept of a table to which I attach the label “table”.

However, in doing so, the catalyst for evoking those memories so that I can form the general concept would often be seeing for the second, third (maybe umpteenth time, if I’m not too bright) an object that someone is telling me is a table. So I did not will the recall of those memories. There were brought out unconsciously as I was storing into memory the current percept. But whether my recall was willful or not, those memories are all percepts, right?

But what of my recognition of the relationship connecting these percepts? When I have that seemingly instant recognition that they are all objects that belong to the same category labeled “table”, I am now conscious of a new concept I have. Is that recognition itself a percept arising from the brain neurally connecting memories of tables? If so, how is the general concept of “table” distinct from such a percept? The fact that I then have to consciously chose to remember it as a concept?

And is this catalytic recognition different from the deliberate process of mulling over thoughts with the goal of recognizing what, if any, relationship connects them? If memory is physical (and I agree that it is), I understand how the brain might automatically connect memories of tables because they are literally stored together. Thus, the unwilled catalyst for recognition that is either the concept or the immediate predicate for it. If I am deliberately attempting to connect thoughts, then I am willing recognition (though I must be careful to not do so rationalistically). But does that make recognition in that case something different?

What I am thinking out loud about is this: Is recognition a function of memory (thus, a physically reducible percept) or consciousness (a product of reasoning)? Then, if recognition is a function of memory, how is it distinct from conceptualization?

Regards, Bill

Hi Bill,

I have to say I am very pleased by your insight into the nature of memory. I also think you have correctly grasped the nature of how early “concepts” are formed. Rand’s description is, for what are universal concepts, technically correct, but she seems to miss the fact that it is much less formal and structured than she describes.

I’m going to attempt to answer a couple of your questions, but I may not have understood them perfectly.

“However, in doing so, the catalyst for evoking those memories so that I can form the general concept would often be seeing for the second, third (maybe umpteenth time, if I’m not too bright) an object that someone is telling me is a table. So I did not will the recall of those memories. There were brought out unconsciously as I was storing into memory the current percept. But whether my recall was willful or not, those memories are all percepts, right?”

Since all that we can store in memory is perceptual data, whatever comes from memory is perceptual data which we are conscious of as percepts, so the answer to your last question is, yes, they are all percepts.

“But what of my recognition of the relationship connecting these percepts? When I have that seemingly instant recognition that they are all objects that belong to the same category labeled “table”, I am now conscious of a new concept I have. Is that recognition itself a percept arising from the brain neurally connecting memories of tables? If so, how is the general concept of “table” distinct from such a percept? The fact that I then have to consciously chose to remember it as a concept?”

You have inadvertently slipped something in here, without noticing it. Notice, “all objects that belong to the same category labeled ‘table.’” What you have not noticed is, you have used a “word” (table) to identify “all objects that belong to the same category.” A word is, as Ayn Rand correctly identified, an “auditory or visual symbol which stands for …” that which it identifies. What she got wrong was that a word stands for a concept, when what it stands for is whatever existent or class of existents it stands for, and using a word in that way is a concept.

But notice, a word is a perceiveable (auditory or visual symbol) which when in consciousness will cause the recall of whatever it is the symbol is a symbol for, however detailed or abstract that memory needs to be.

“But does that make recognition in that case something different?”

Yes, recognition is something different than conceptualization. Recognition is part of that automatic response of recall to the content of memory which is there from the very beginning of consciousness; conceptualization comes only after one is able to associate symbols with what is recalled from memory and only after one has leaned to “attend to” specific recalled memory percepts in relationship to perceived symbols. The process is simple enough, but very difficult to describe.

“What I am thinking out loud about is this: Is recognition a function of memory (thus, a physically reducible percept) or consciousness (a product of reasoning)? Then, if recognition is a function of memory, how is it distinct from conceptualization?”

Recognition is a function of memory (that much is a function of the brain which provides stored perceptual data) as a response to the content of consciousness (which is itself not a physical attribute). What recognition does in humans is simply provide related store perceptual data to consciuosness. Conceptualization is only possible after one has learned how to select (by attention)from what is presented to consciousness from memory, what relates to a symbol for a particular existent, and what does not, and to do that enough for the relationship to become habituated, or, “more or less” automatic.

I am going to discuss the volitional nature of “attention” when I get to start the volition thread. In the meantime, I’m trying to finish another post to this thread concerning a mistake Rand made, which relates strongly to the questions you are asking, and that will be followed by a post on emotion, which is also strongly related. I think those posts will also answer some of your questions.

I have not edited or spell-checked any of this, but your good questions deserved answers, and I only hope I have done them justice.

Regi